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RI SK. SECU RJTY , 1"4Sl RANCE.
AND THE COST OF PROTECTION*
Dale 0 . Cloninger
In a world of perfect certainty, protection against hazards
becomes merely a matter of routine planning and preparation for
coming events. Disasters occur only because of lack of discipline to
take the necessary adequate precautions. In an uncertain world,
the problem of coping with hazards takes on added complexity as
the three elements of uncertainty - events, their magnitudes, and
their timing - all or in part become unknown. Perfect certainty
implies knowledge of all three while uncertainty implies ignorance
of only one, although any two or all three may be unknown. The
analysis given below will only consider those uncertainties that are
insurable - that is, t he events are known and their occurrence is
subject to some known, well defined probability distribution, but
the magnitude and/ or the timing of the events are unknown.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze individual purchasing
behavior with respect to risk losses, security devices and insurance. The discussion will be t·ouched in terms of crim inal activity
from the viewpoint of a potential victim. However, the same
analysis could equally apply to potential victims of other insurable
losses as well. The hypothesis proposed is that decisions to allocate
present endowments to either market insurance or self protection
are independent of attempts to minimize the costs of total protection (the sum of market insurance and self protection costs). That
is, the optimal amounts of market insurance and self protection are
inversely related such that expected income can be maximized
regardless of the relative distribution of allocations to market
insurance and self protection. Specifically, it will be shown that the
total cost of protection is independent of the relative amount of
insurance and security devices purchased .
Traditional theory holds that the total cost of protection is the
sum of costs of security devices plus the costs of insurance. It is
theorized, therefore, that the total cost of protection can he minimized by a proper allocation of funds to each of the two compon ents. The first of these premises is a tautology and is not the
subject of this discussion. The second premise involves an analysis
of choices between certain and expected (uncertain) losses. Again
the discussion is centered around criminal activity.
• The author wishes to acknowledge with appreciation the helpful
comments and assistance of Dr. J erry Todd of the University of
Texas, Dr. Mike Mizino of the University of Houston at Clear
Lake City. and an anonymous referee.
1

The costs an individual will experience as a result of the
existence of crime will be the sum of his share of the cost of public
enforcement, the amount of private protection he prefers and in
the absence of market insurance, t he expected cost of being a
victim. The first of these costs is not subject to his control and
therefore, in this analysis is shown as a parameter within which h;
must operate. The two remaining are discretionary in the sen~
that the individual ean alter his expected eosts due to criminal activity by increasing his expenditures on private preventative measures. Losses due to criminal and preventative costs may be minimized by allocating funds to private preventative measures up to
the point where the last dollar spent just results in an equivalent
reduction in the expected cost of being a victim (i.e., the point
where the marginal benefit of the measure just equals its marginal
cost). But minimizing dollar losses may not be an appropriate goal
for the individual where there exist elements of uncertainty (as in
the case of expected victim costs). Optimization would occur when
allocations were mad e so that the disutility experienced as a result
of a certain loss (private pre ventative measures) for the last dollar
allocated equalled the expected disutility not experienced as a
result of the corresponding reduction in the probability of incurring
victim costs. Dollar and utility minimization would only lead to
identical solutions if the individual were risk neutral. An alternative way of stating the utility condition is that the individual would
allocate his funds up to the point where the marginal utility per
dollar obtained from the last unit of security purchased just
equalled that of the last unit of self insurance 1 (ex pected victim
loss) foregone.
Whereas the utility maximizing condition can be stated it can be
achieved only under special circumstances. As Ehrlich and Becker
point out, with regard to expenditures on security devices, "Decreasing marginal utility of income is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition [for optimality). (Optimality ] is always satisfied if
the marginal utility of income is constant and may or may n?t be
satisfied if the marginal utility is decreasing or increasing." - Th_e
remainder of this analysis, therefore, will assume constant marginal utility of income (for utility maximization ) or, equivalently,
maximization of expected income. In the present eontext the
concern will be the minimization of the total costs of protection.
In the presence of market insurance the issue. then, redures to
the distribution of the costs of total protection among its various
forms. For present. use, protection will be divided into only t~.o
parts: ( 1) devices, mechanisms, or individuals that. provide specific
forms of protection, e.g., locks, safes, watch dogs, body guards and
the like. For convenience, all of t hese items will be referred to as
security deviees; (2) methods of indemnifying losses incurred as a
result of crime - that is, market insurance .
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In the following analysis, time will be held to a single period. The
analysis will concern itself primarily with expected monetary costs
in order to demonstrate that allocations to protection measures are
perfect substitutes for allocations to market insurance. (i.e., Dollars allocated to one will result in an equal dollar reduction in the
cost of the other.) Further assumptions include perfect competition
in all relevant markets, known and well defined probability distribution for each type of hazard and known incomes (or cash
equivalents) for each asset protected. It is also assumed there are
no "loading" or administrative charges on insurance premiums.
Proposition I: The value of a security device is equal to the reduction in the probability of the hazard occurring times the income
protected. Or,
VSD

=

(B0

Where, VSD

-

Bw)S

(1)

= value (cost) of security device with a one period
lifetime

=
Bw = probability of hazard (loss) with the device during the
BO

probability of hazard (loss) without the device during the
period. 1
period.

S = income (or cash equivalent) of asset(s) protected which is
not realized until the end of the period.4

Proposition I must hold for if VSD < (B0 - Bw lS, it would pay the
individual to continue purchasing the device since the expected loss
avoided is greater than the cost (a certain loss). If VSD > (B0 Bw)S, it would pay to give up the device since the expected loss is
less than the cost of the df.>vice. The law of diminishing returns
insures that 180 - BwlS falls as additional units of the device are
Pmploycd.
P_r?position II: The period insurance premium is equal to the probability of a loss times the period income (or cash equivalent) of the
protected asset(s). Or,
I•

= BS - period insurance premium ;

(2)

Again, this p~oposition must hold for if I• >BS, it would not pay
to_purc_hase the insurance. but to become self insured since the premium 1s_ greater than the expected loss. C(lnversely, if I•< 13S,
market insurance would be the better {less costly) buy. It fotlows,
therefore. that:
I

=8

0S

and

I'= BwS

(3)

14)

3

where,

= insurance premium necessary without security device
I' = insurance premium necessary with security device.
I

The third and final proposition is the traditional identity of tot~
cost cited earlier,
TCp= VSD

+I'

(51
The necessary conditions are satisfied to determine the effect ol
private protection allocations on the total cost of protection. Substr
tuting (1) and (4) into (5), the following is obtained:
TCP

= (BQ - BwJS + BwS
= B :s · BwS + BwS
=B S
0

0

(6)

This result (6) is exactly the cost of protection if no security devi«
had been employed. The cost of protection is simply transferred
dollar for dollar from insurance premiums to security devices as th,
latter are employed. As a result of this direct transfer. there is nc
optimum amount of insurance or security devices which minimiu
the total cost of protection . The combination of insurance ano
security devices purchased is, therefore, only a function of indiVI
dual tastes and preferences for each type of loss. Since both losses
are certain, the differences hetween them, as utility producing expenditures. reduce to the following: insurance protection repre
sents, for the most part, compensation after the hazard has
occurred while security devices represent a reduction in the incident of the hazard. An individual who purchases relatively more
insurance than another, assuming identical risks and assets,
expressing his willingness to accept greater incidence of the hazard
and be compensated for it while the latter would rather forego
some of the incidence and accept a lower level of total compensa·
tion. However, if the com pensation is total the individual should ~e
indifferent between the two losses. Compensation is seldom total m
a world where pain, suffering and sentiment are difficult to
measure. In addition, deductibles and self insurance are often
substituted for market insurance by those units whose utility_ of
other cash demanding purchases exceeds the disutility of assuming
the additional risks of self insurance - the Friedman-Savage
thesis. The presence of less than total compensation would prov~de
an incentive for economic units to purchase varying relative
amounts of security.
The conclusion reached is that the total cost of protection, in _a
single period for "insurable" hazards with no "loading" charges, is
independent of the allocations of payments to insurance and security devices. Recognizing that actual insurance premiums are a
multiple of the no load premiums, a question that remains is, "Why
are individuals willing to pay more for insurance than has been
justified by the above analysis?" The difference represents the
4
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premium paid in order to avoid the disutility of having to bear the
risk of potential losses. Likewise, individuals may also pay prices
for security devices in excess of their theoretical value in order to
reduce the probability (risk) of potential losses. The price of
security devices will, as a result, be higher than their actuarial fair
price to cover the costs of administration much the same as
insurance premiums. Hence, the presence of "loading" charges
should not alter the conclusion that there is no unique combination
of insurance and security that will minimize the total cost of protection.
A Mathemat ical S ummary

Ehrlich and Becker did not recognize the conclusions developed
here in their earlier article. They apparently ignored the fact that
expenditures on self protection (security devices) were also a
function of p and that pis a function of the technical ability of varying amounts (in units) of security to reduce expected losses. Transforming our notation to theirs, we can see and verify the arguments
given above.
Let,

11

= I ' = BwS

k 1 = B0 S which is constant

kz

r = VSD = (80 -Bw)S

= S which is constant

p = Bw

r• = units of security
Since,

k1 - r

11

n'(r)
n

Therefore,

-I

(I)

pkz

al so.

n'(p) = kz

(2)

We know that,

n'( r*) = •n'(r)

which can be verified by,

r'(r•)

then,

Tr, ( r)

11'

If

.,, ' ( r)

-1

then,

r' ( r")

-n'(r*).

But

n, (r")

1T' (

and

r'(r")

P, ( r*) . r' ( p).

(r*)/r' (r*) .

(3)

p) . P' ( r")

(4)
(5)

Substituting (4) and (5) into (3) gives,
P, ( r•) · r'(p) = -[Tr'(p)

p' ( r") I
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a

I

w
Cancelling p'(r*) y ields , r'(p)
If

- (11'

(p)J .

(6)

r = B0 S - flwS
= kl - pk z

r' ( p)

(7 )

= -kz

Substituti ng (1) and (7) into (6) yields , -kz
thus , n' (r)

=

-[kz J

-1 (1) is verified.

The above being subject to the following constraints:
r' ( r *)

>

p'(r*)

0

0

r' '( r*)

p' '(r*)

<

0
>,

0

• ' ( p) > 0
11' '(p)

0
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FOOTNOTES
Self insurance is herein defined to be the absence of market
insur ance. It is the assumption by the individual of the risk or
probability of a potential loss - the individual has underwritte n his
own risk. This definition differs from that used elsewhere (Ehrlich
and Becker ) where it refers to the reduction in the extent of the
potential loss.
1

2 Ehr lich, Issac and Becker, Gary S . "Market Insurance, Self
Insurance, and Self Protection." Journal of Political Economy, Vol.
80, No. 4, July/ August 1972, p. 639.

3 The probability (B ) represents the likelihood that a given
0
hazard will occur for any one particular asset as a result of
experience gained by numerous similar "risk" classes. In this
manner (B0 ) need not be for an unprotected asset, but only one
which has a "standard" amount of protection (e.g., handrails on
stairs or spring locks on doors ).
1

Losses are assumed total. For partial losses, a separate probability distribution would have to be developed and S would then
become the expected value of the loss. Ehrlich and Becker demonstrate that market insurance and "self insurance" (reduction in
extent of the loss) are perfect substitutes (pp. 635-636). a conclusion in which I find no fault. In the context of present notation the
formula for VSD would become (B0 • Bw)cx:S where O~a~l. The
ass umption here is that ex:
1. Since expenditures on ex: and I are
perfect substitutes, the omission of the former is not serious to this
analysis.

=
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The insurance premium, recall, is defined here to be the actuarially fair price of the insurance. This argument does not mean lo
imply that purchasers of insurance would not be willing to pay a
price in excess of this amount, but that in the long run and at the
margin the total insurance premium would not exceed thr actuarially fair price plus the "normal" cost of administration. the latter
being abstracted from the present analysis.

Dale 0. Cloninger is an Associate Professor of Finance and Public
Affairs at the University of Houston at Clear Lake City.
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